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Abstract
This study reviews a 1997 study released by Nike to resolve wage controversies
in subcontracted Asian factories. An ethnostatistical analysis is provided to show
how the application of the three levels of ethnostatistics can help us understand
differing interpretations of the same data. The current analysis is evidence of
the way in which context, assumptions and methodology, and rhetoric and
language can influence the outcome of quantitative studies. The current study
is an important methodological note because academic researchers are being
called to answer important questions regarding the global operations of
transnational corporations. This raises the question of our role as academic
researchers and what standards, such as validity and reliability, should be met.
Organization Management Journal (2008) 5, 119–131. doi:10.1057/omj.2008.12
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Introduction
Ethnostatistics is ‘‘the study of the construction, interpretation,
and display of statistics in quantitative social research’’ (Gephart,
1988: 9). Ethnostatistics is an attempt ‘‘to bridge the gap between
quantitative and qualitative research’’ (Gephart, 1988: 6). Ethnostatistics helps us understand how statistics in quantitative research
are created and their meaning and, thus, helps us identify problems
in the creation and interpretation of statistical data.
The fundamental concern of ethnostatistics is in describing, analyzing,
explaining, and understanding how statistics are actually accomplished and
used in the research process. Ethnostatistics thus examines the qualitative aspects
of doing statistical analyses, and treats statistical analyses as sources of insight
into social processes that underlay scientific knowledge. (Gephart, 1988: 11)

Ethnostatistics, then, is a qualitative study of the quantitative
research process involved in the creation and use of statistics. There
are three levels for ethnostatistical analyses:
1. First-order ethnostatistical studies focus on how the statistic is
constructed, ‘‘the activities, meanings, and contexts involved in
producing variables and statistics’’ (Gephart, 1988: 13), studies
of the cultural features of groups of scientists at work, and
studies of the social enterprise of creating statistics.
2. Second-order ethnostatistical studies focus on the assumptions
and the appropriateness of the statistical techniques used.
3. Third-order ethnostatistical studies focus on the rhetoric and use
of language as a tool of persuasion.
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We seek to demonstrate the application of
ethnostatistics and show that it is a useful tool in
understanding and interpreting statistical data
from quantitative studies. Ethnostatistics has been
used to examine a variety of work (Boje et al., 2006;
Kilduff and Oh, 2006; Mills et al., 2006). We use a
historical document that was highly publicized and
very controversial at the time of its release, and we
analyze it from the three levels of ethnostatistics.
In 1997, a wage study was released by Dartmouth
College’s Amos Tuck School of Business (Calzini
et al., 1997). The Tuck study concluded that Nike,
Inc. paid adequate wages to factory workers, yet
numerous critics found flaws with the study and its
subsequent conclusions (Greenhouse, 1997; Boje,
1998; Landrum and Boje, 2000). Through the use of
ethnostatistics, we seek to explain how divergent
readings of the same statistical report are possible.
The focus of our paper, ‘‘Using an Ethnostatistical
Analysis to Interpret Data: The Nike Case,’’ is on
methodology and not on Nike company practices.

First-order ethnostatistics
First-order ethnostatistical studies focus on how the
statistic is constructed, ‘‘the activities, meanings,
and contexts involved in producing variables and
statistics’’ (Gephart, 1988: 13). These are studies of
the cultural features of groups of scientists at work
and studies of the social enterprise of creating
statistics. First-order studies observe the researchers
at work, interview the researchers, and examine
their documents to better understand how the
statistics were produced; first-order studies are an
ethnographic study of the data collector and the
data collection process. This typically involves
‘‘direct empirical observation of the actual behaviors and natural practices of statistics producers’’
(p. 13). Although we cannot observe the Tuck
researchers at work ad hoc, we can examine the
context for a better understanding of the activities
and meanings behind the creation of the study and
the statistics.
In the mid- and late-1990s, Nike was highly
criticized for wage and labor practices in their
foreign factories. CBS’ 48 Hours aired a segment on
17 October 1996 showing Nike’s subcontractor
plants in Vietnam. Women and children were
working in substandard conditions in Nike factories. On 20 March 1997, Thuyen Nguyen of
Vietnam Labor Watch released his findings of Nike
labor practices in Vietnam. He criticized Nike for
paying low wages, working employees to the point
of exhaustion, physical abuse of workers by man-
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agement, and restricted water and bathroom privileges for employees.
On 20 March 1997, Mr. Thuyen Nguyen, an
investment banker of Vietnam Labor Watch
released a qualitative study (Nguyen, 1997).
About 35,000 workers at five Vietnamese plants – more than
90 percent of them young women – put in 12-hour days
making Nike shoes. Though labor costs amount to less than
$2 a pair, the shoes retail for up to $180 in the United States.
The Vietnamese workers earn $2.40 a day – only slightly
more than the $2 or so it costs to buy three meals a day. It is
a common occurrence to have several workers faint from
exhaustion, heat and poor nutrition during their shifts
beatings are common Nike clearly is not controlling its
contractors, and the company has known about this for a
long time workers interviewed by VLW say they are not
allowed to use the bathroom more than once in an 8-hour
shift and are allowed to drink water only twice per shift.
Both the water and the bathrooms are controlled by card or
hat systems – workers must request the card or hat from
their supervisor before they are allowed to use the facilities.
The VLW report notes that the number of cards or hats are
limited to 3 cards for 78-person assembly line and 4 cards
for a 300-person line. Violating this rule three times can
result in dismissal. (Vietnam Labor Watch, 1997: 3–4)

By mid-1997, dozens of activist organizations
were questioning why despotic sweat shop, child
labor, and physical abuse practices of the 19th
century were being tolerated at the end of the 20th
century, especially by a US corporation such as Nike
that commodifies a progressive, ethical, and profitable image in its ads and sponsored sporting events.
Philip Knight and Nike, Inc. were under attack for
labor practices in their foreign plants. In response,
they held press conferences, took out newspaper
ads, and tried to divert the negative publicity.
Nike’s response style had been defensiveness and
denial (Landrum and Boje, 2000). In retrospect, it is
likely that they wanted validation that their global
practices were not as bad as the accusations stated.
They hired labor rights activist Andrew Young to
independently assess the enforcement of their Code
of Conduct in Asian factories. In addition, Nike
needed a study that would ‘‘develop a clear and
current perspective on the suitability of wages and
benefits paid to its Vietnamese and Indonesian
contract factory workers’’ (Calzini et al., 1997: 4).
‘‘Tuck faculty undertook a similar wage-and-needs
study of Disney workers in Haiti. In the face of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Tuck’s
study gave Disney a clean bill of health’’ (O’Rourke,
1998: 1). Tuck is known as conservative and for
conducting favorable studies for other corporations
on their foreign labor practices (Campaign for
Labor Rights, 1998: 1).
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Nike contacted Dartmouth College, Amos Tuck
Business School professors Joseph Massey and
Eugene Mihaly to supervise the study through the
Tuck Center for International Business. The consulting project was turned over to a team of five
first-year MBA students and all research expenses
were paid by Nike. The students were divided into
two teams, one went to Indonesia and one went to
Vietnam.
First-order ethnostatistics examines who produces the statistics as well as who the statistics
represent. Data were collected and statistics produced by five students in the MBA program under
the supervision of two professors. As Gephart
(1988) points out, ‘‘Those who collect data may
be different from those who apply higher-order
statistical procedures to the data, and may have
different interests or concerns (Bodgan and Ksander, 1980)’’ (p. 15).
The data were being gathered ‘‘to determine how
well suited [Nike] wages are to the local economies
and whether they are sufficient to allow the
workers to sustain a reasonable standard of living
for themselves and their families’’ (Calzini et al.,
1997: 4) and were intended to represent factory
workers. However, after meeting with Vietnamese
factory managers, the students reported, ‘‘y in
order to obtain a broad and unbiased sample, our
survey more broadly targeted local residents of the
VS and VJ areas rather than just factory workers’’
(Calzini et al., 1997: 5). They go on to explain
It became evident to us that the factory workers would not
be an ‘‘objective’’ population to sample, given that many of
the workers had already been surveyed and interviewed
extensively by both NIKE Labor Practices and outside
consultants. The fear was that many of the factory workers
had become fully aware of the intent of these surveys and
were no longer motivated to respond in an unbiased
fashion. Because of this possibility, we decided to extend
ourselves to surveying residents within the local vicinities
surrounding the factories to collect the information we
sought. (Calzini et al., 1997: 10–11)

As a result, the study selected two of the five
Vietnam factories, the Sam Yang Vietnam Company factory (VS) and the Chang Shin Vietnam
Company factory (VJ) and surveyed their surrounding community residents. These two factory communities were selected because they represent the
lowest and highest mean wages paid, according to a
Nike Labor Update Survey from 5 August 1997, and
the lowest and highest government-mandated
minimum wages (Calzini et al., 1997). The research
teams randomly selected 78 households in the VS

community and 68 households in the VJ community. Every third house along main streets, side
alleys, and hamlets were surveyed. The teams
were accompanied by independent translators;
therefore, the task of first-level ethnostatistical
analysis becomes even more difficult because data
were collected and translated through a third party.
Given the predominance and importance of the
family unit, the researchers collected household
data, divided it by number of household members,
and then made adjustments for economies of scale
to create individual profiles. Thus, the data in the
Tuck study represent randomly selected local
residents of the communities in which the Nike
subcontract factories are located rather than representing the factory workers themselves and, without transcripts, we cannot be certain of any
translation or cultural difficulties encountered in
collecting data and creating the statistics.
Through the use of first-order ethnostatistics, we
examine the context within which the statistics
were created as well as who created the statistics
and whom the statistics represent. Nike was in the
midst of criticism and crisis over manufacturing in
their subcontracted factories. Highly respected
figures with a history of ‘‘favorable studies’’ were
contracted to examine the claims of critics. Nike’s
brand and reputation were at stake and the results
of the studies would have an important impact on
Nike’s image. Data for the study under question
here were collected from community residents
instead of factory workers and were collected by
translators accompanied by students who were
supervised by professors.

Second-order ethnostatistics
Second-order ethnostatistical studies focus on the
assumptions and the appropriateness of the statistical techniques used. Second-order studies are
reflective, critique the practices used in constructing the statistics, and offer more appropriate
alternatives. We seek to critique the assumptions
and methods of the Tuck study and offer alternative
analyses of the data.
The study has been the subject of widespread
analysis since its release in 1997. Nike officials have
contended the study is both valid and reliable.
Several authors and activists have questioned the
validity and reliability of the study (Campaign for
Labor Rights, 1997, 1998; O’Rourke, 1997, 1998;
Boje, 1998; Landrum and Boje, 2000) but without
doing an empirical reanalysis of the findings or
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subjecting the interpretations to recognized validity criteria.
Were Tuck methods appropriate for the research
question under study? Nike wanted a study that
would ‘‘develop a clear and current perspective on
the suitability of wages and benefits paid to its
Vietnamese and Indonesian contract factory workers’’ (Calzini et al., 1997: 4). The Tuck researchers
sought to measure spending, discretionary income,
and savings. However, due to the predominance of
extended families in single households, Tuck chose
to conduct the study at a household level of
analysis rather than at an individual level of
analysis. Household figures were then transformed
into estimates of individual averages by dividing
household figures by the number of occupants,
‘‘with adjustments where appropriate to account
for household economies of scale’’ (Calzini et al.,
1997: 15). Figures were further adjusted to simulate
a single person’s living style.
This methodology and the conclusions of this
study were brought into question (O’Rourke, 1998).
O’Rourke cites three main problems with the Tuck
report:
(1) the data collected by the Tuck team lead to different
conclusions than they report; (2) their methodology is
seriously flawed; and (3) analysis of the ‘‘suitability of wages
and benefits’’ at Nike factories would require a significantly
different study. (O’Rourke, 1998: 3)

O’Rourke provides an excellent discussion in each
of these areas.
For example, Tuck intended to survey factory
workers at all five Vietnamese locations. However,
after meeting with management, ‘‘it became evident to us that the factory workers would not be an
‘objective’ population to sample’’ (Calzini et al.,
1997: 10–11). The Tuck team then decided to
survey residents within two factory communities.
‘‘In order to obtain a broad and unbiased sample,
our survey more broadly targeted local residents of
the VS and VJ areas rather than just factory
workers’’ (Calzini et al., 1997: 5). They randomly
selected households by choosing every third house
and conducted personal interviews. The two communities selected had the lowest and highest
government-mandated minimum wages. This
method allowed Tuck to use community household
data and extrapolate Nike factory workers’ wages,
without ever interviewing Nike factory workers to
obtain information.
Average factory wages paid were figures given to
the team by the factory management, not figures
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gathered directly from the workers themselves.
Management reported the average wage paid at VJ
to be $56.30 per month and at VS to be $47.73 per
month. Through their data collection method, the
research team was able to fortuitously interview
some Nike factory workers. O’Rourke (1998) points
out that an examination of the data collected in the
study shows that the average wages reported by VJ
workers were 475,135 dong or $40.95 per month.
Furthermore, O’Rourke notes that eight of those
workers reported monthly wages at 300,000 dong
or $25.86 per month, which is below the government-mandated minimum wage of $35 per month.
Likewise, seven VS workers reported wages below
the government-mandated minimum wage in that
area of $45 per month.
Among some of the Tuck findings, the authors
assert that non-Nike community wage earners are
saving between 47 and 49% of their income, so
Nike workers at two sites (VS and VJ) can do the
same (Calzini et al., 1997: 24). In another chart,
Tuck makes it seem that Nike (subcontract) workers
in Vietnam are able to save as much as 44% of their
$46.35-a-month wages as discretionary income
(Calzini et al., 1997: 29). An earlier study by
Vietnam Labor Watch (1997) does not match the
Tuck findings. In this Vietnam Labor Watch (1997)
study, which interviewed 35 Nike workers, Thuyen
Nguyen concluded that workers were losing weight
and had to write home for money.
To further our second-level analysis and to
demonstrate how assumptions and the appropriateness of the statistical techniques used can
influence outcomes, we obtained the actual
extended report, including all its appendices and
data set, and offer a reanalysis of the original survey
data for Vietnam to explore basic issues of reliability and validity. Data in Indonesia were collected
in a different manner and for that reason are being
excluded from this note. We used data from the
Tuck Consulting Group’s appendix (Calzini et al.,
1997), cleaned up errors, and made what we think
are more reasonable calculation procedures. We
reconstructed Tuck’s statistics.
Tables 1 and 2 compare Calzini et al.’s (1997: 26–
28) spending profile displays with our new calculations in Tables 3 and 4. The ‘‘new’’ results (Tables 3
and 4) agree with the Vietnam Labor Watch (1997)
study. Nike workers in both Vietnam plants are
earning wages far below community living standards and are not able to make ends meet. But, how
does Tuck construct a story so different from
Vietnam Labor Watch and our analysis? A closer
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Table 1 Does a typical individual spending profile indicate that
VS and VJ minimum wages are sufficient to allow for savings?
(Tuck)

VS ($)

VJ ($)

Factory mean wage
Food
Housing/rent
Clothing/footwear
Utilities (electric, water, gas/wood, fuel)
Transport
Health care
Education
Total essentials
Phone
Entertainment
Other taxes, deductions
Total nonessentials
Total expenditures

44.83
12.93
3.45
2.84
1.90
0
1.03
0
22.16
0.69
0
2.33
3.02
25.17

47.41
15.52
3.45
2.84
1.90
0
1.29
0
25.00
0.69
0
2.33
3.02
28.02

Discretionary income

19.66

19.40

Table 2 Do average VS and VJ wages (for two) better match
household expenditure levels? (Tuck)

VS ($)

VJ ($)

Factory mean wage
Food
Housing/rent
Clothing/footwear
Utilities (electric, water, gas/wood, fuel)
Transport
Health care
Education
Total essentials
Phone
Entertainment
Other taxes, deductions
Total nonessentials
Total expenditures

95.43
51.72
0
3.97
9.31
12.93
6.03
5.60
89.57
5.86
1.03
4.66
11.55
101.12

112.59
51.72
0
5.78
7.76
12.93
3.88
8.62
90.69
4.31
4.31
4.66
13.28
103.97

Discretionary income

(5.69)

8.62

examination of how Tuck’s statistics were constructed is necessary. If the tables were recalculated
using means instead of medians, then workers in
Table 2, on average, would be losing $55.84 and
$34.15 at VS and VJ, respectively. The use of the
median statistic, while common in this type of study,
favors Nike by understating income and expense
distributions in the area. It may also be a misrepresentation to sample only on the main streets,
and alleyways where there are many small shops,
restaurants, and possibly substandard conditions
(in alleyways) where wages may be much lower.

Table 3 Does a typical individual spending profile indicate that
VS and VJ minimum wages are sufficient to allow for savings?
(Landrum and Boje calculations)

VS ($)

VJ ($)

Factory mean wage
Food
Housing/rent
Clothing/footwear
Utilities (electric, water, gas/wood, fuel)
Transport
Health care
Education
Total essentials
Phone
Entertainment
Other taxes, deductions
Total nonessentials
Total expenditures

44.83
25.86
4.49
0.75
2.55
2.59
1.84
3.59
41.68
1.47
0.26
2.33
4.05
45.73

47.41
25.86
3.45
1.44
2.23
2.59
2.64
5.50
43.70
0.097
1.00
2.33
4.29
47.99

Discretionary income

(0.90)

0.58

Table 4 Do average VS and VJ wages (for two) better match
household expenditure levels? (Landrum and Boje calculations)

VS ($)

VJ ($)

Factory mean wage
Food
Housing/rent
Clothing/footwear
Utilities (electric, water, gas/wood, fuel)
Transport
Health care
Education
Total essentials
Phone
Entertainment
Other taxes, deductions
Total nonessentials
Total expenditures

95.46
51.72
15.09
3.95
13.15
12.93
8.41
5.57
110.82
5.86
1.03
4.66
11.55
122.37

112.60
51.72
3.45
5.75
14.68
12.93
6.21
8.62
103.36
4.31
4.31
4.66
13.28
116.64

Discretionary income

(26.91)

(4.04)

From Table 1, we conclude that Nike (VS and VJ)
wages are no match for the household expenditure
levels in the vicinity of these Nike factories. In
Table 2, Tuck finds that the median household size
in the community is four persons with two income
earners. But there are rounding and other errors, as
well as misrepresentations which spin out a story of
VS workers only losing $5.69, while VJ workers
retain $8.62. After cleaning up the errors and
misrepresentations, the more realistic figures are a
loss of $26.91 and $4.04, respectively (Table 4).
Therefore, even using the more conservative
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Tuck spending profiles of Table 2, the recalculations
(Table 4) show findings that are grossly different.
In Table 1, Tuck, compares workers in two
factories (VS and VJ) to its sample of 300 adults
living in 146 households around the factories.1 It is
not actually measuring Nike worker’s budgets, only
their wages. The budget expenditure items come
from a survey of non-Nike households. The more
obvious question is why not interview the workers
themselves instead of a contrived sample of local
families with non-Nike wage earners.
For example, for food costs they use a median per
household member figure from a community
survey (i.e., $12.93 and $15.52 for children and
old folks averaged in), instead of the per wage
earner figure ($25.86 in both) we selected (from
p. 29 of their appendix).
In Table 2, Tuck uses the wage earner food value,
which we employed in Table 3, but this time treats
housing/rent costs as zero, by claiming the ‘‘vast
majority of [community] residents own their own
homes’’ (Calzini et al., 1997: 28). But, in the
appendix to the Tuck report, they show families
in the area have median housing/rent expenses of
$15.09 and $3.45 for VS and VJ, respectively.
Furthermore, when we look at the Tuck report, we
see that ‘‘the only single person households we
encountered were those of factory workers who had
come from distant provinces’’ (Calzini et al., 1997:
17). They go on to report that ‘‘VJ has attracted a
large number of workers who are not natives of the
Dong Nai province’’ (Calzini et al., 1997: 12). In
Indonesia, the Tuck study shows that 161 of the
314 respondents (51%) live away from home and
pay rent. Therefore, we include local housing costs
in the budget because excluding them restricts
workers to Nike’s dorm housing and because in
Tuck’s report they stress the importance of the
family living situation in Vietnam.
There is also a misrepresentation in health care
costs. They assume that the 5000 dong mandatory
medical deduction is adequate to cover worker
health care costs. This procedure is questionable
because it invalidates the comparison to what local
household members spend on health care, which is
the point of doing their comparative study.
Furthermore, the exclusion of social insurance
expenses results in understated costs.
Under utilities costs, Tuck’s procedure treats
firewood and cooking fuel as mutually exclusive
items. This does not allow that families may in fact
use both sources in varying amounts. Additionally,
Tuck’s calculation procedures treat electric and
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water as part of the dorm costs. Therefore, total
fuel costs are not considered.
There are also errors in their calculations of
utility costs. For VS, 50,000 þ 45,000 should equal
110,000, not 102,000. For VJ, 45,000 þ 45,300
without rounding equals 90,300.
The inclusion of electric and water as part of
dorm costs is a questionable procedure because it
restricts workers to dorm housing, it invalidates a
meaningful comparison to the local citizen’s living
budget, and because they report that ‘‘nearly all the
homes we survey [SIC] had electricity wired into
house’’ (Calzini et al., 1997: 18). Lastly, there were
differences in calculating mean and median electric
expenses for households between the two factories.
For VS per household figures, if there was no
electric expense it was calculated as zero. For VJ
per household figures, if there was no electric
expense it was omitted. These differences distort
mean and median figures.
Tuck’s calculation procedure in estimating phone
costs is to allow each worker a four phone call
budget at 2000 dong per call at a public telephone
(8000 dong per month). This is a misrepresentation
because it under-represents a comparison to what
local Vietnamese citizens spend on their phone
calls. They show that the expenditures reported in
the household surveys were 17,562 dong per household member in VS and 15,380 dong per household
member in VJ. The 8000 dong per month allowance
is approximately half of the per household member
expenditure reported in the survey.
Tuck does not allow for any transportation costs,
which would restrict workers from leaving the
factory except on bicycle. For VJ, where most
workers are from other areas, it would mean no
budget to visit families. They also report that
average monthly gasoline expenditures for motorbikes were 164,387 dong for VS and 178,487 dong
for VJ, yet no individual figure was calculated. They
report that most VS and VJ workers commute to
work by bicycle but no costs are calculated to allow
for the purchase of the bicycle.
For entertainment expenses, Tuck’s procedure is
not to allow workers any entertainment expense.
According to Tuck, no entertainment costs were
calculated since ‘‘recurring entertainment costs are
highly uncommon for single person households’’
(Calzini et al., 1997: 27). This is a misrepresentation
of their comparison to local living situations and it
is questionable because it changes the definition of
a ‘‘nonessential’’ expense by disallowing all entertainment. The survey results indicate that many
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households rented videotapes regularly (1–2 per
week) at a cost of 1000–2000 dong per tape. This
should equal a household average of 4000–16,000
dong per month and, to be consistent, should be
converted into an average individual expenditure.
The authors reported that televisions, VCRs, and
radio/cassette players were common but did not
include these expenses.
Tuck’s procedure for calculating education costs
disallows any education cost for single workers. No
education costs were calculated since ‘‘single
factory workers typically do not attend school’’
(Calzini et al., 1997: 27). This procedure would not
allow workers to save for their future education,
and once again invalidates comparison to what
local Vietnamese citizens are investing in their
education.
We find another error in Tuck’s calculations of
wages. Informants number 520 and 550 do not
match the actual minimum wage paid of 527 and
548, respectively, on page 5 of the Tuck report (in
thousands).
Lastly, Tuck states that ‘‘approximately 48% of
households surveyed in both the VS and VJ areas
can save either regularly or from time to time’’
(Calzini et al., 1997: 24). However, when the
researchers encountered a Nike worker in the
household surveyed, they noted that ‘‘they very
rarely accumulate personal savings on a recurring
basis either for emergency purposes or for anticipated future expenditures such as education’’
(Calzini et al., 1997: 7).
We performed regression analysis as another way
of analyzing the Tuck data. Regression allows us to
determine if statistically significant relationships
exist between variables, such as Nike employment
and discretionary income.
We first performed regression analysis on the two
groups (VS and VJ) to determine if there were
significant differences. The analyses showed no
significant differences between the two factory
communities in terms of household income, discretionary income, savings, spending, or household
size. We also found that the number of dependents
was not a significant predictor of household
income, savings, or spending.
We found that both the number of Nike workers
in the household and the number of non-Nike
workers (‘‘Other’’) were significant predictors of
household income. The R2 was 0.343. The R2-value
tells the variance accounted for in the dependent
variable when all the independent variables in
the model are combined. The b-value for Nike

was 350,594.5 and the b-value for Other was
448,459.2. The b-values show how much the
dependent variable (household income) will
change for every one-unit change in the independent variable (number of Nike or non-Nike
workers in the household). Only Other was a
significant predictor of household savings, with
a b-value of 63,171.43. Other was also a significant
predictor of household spending, with a b-value of
170,959.5.
Both the number of Nike workers and non-Nike
workers in a household are significantly related to
household discretionary income. The b-values for
both Nike and Other were 262,237.6 and 302,479.8,
respectively.
In regressions of interaction terms, there was a
multicollinearity problem. Centering the data corrected the multicollinearity but the interaction
terms were still not significant.
What these regressions tell us is that, despite
Tuck’s report that VJ community households had
higher income levels and expenditures than did VS
community households, there were no statistically
significant differences in the two communities in
terms of household income, discretionary income,
savings, spending, or household size.
Significant correlations are shown between Other
and household income, household savings, and
household discretionary income. The number of
Nike workers in the household was not significantly
related to any of these variables. Again, this is
inconsistent with what would be expected from the
Tuck conclusions.
Interestingly, the analyses showed that each
addition of one Nike worker into the household
would increase the household income by 350,594.5
dong or $30.09 per month. Each addition of one
non-Nike worker into the household will increase
the household income by 448,459.8 dong or $38.49
per month. This indicates that being employed
outside of the Nike factory contributes more to the
household income than does being employed in a
Nike factory. These figures also seem inconsistent
with what is reported as factory mean wages and
factory base wages. According to Calzini et al.
(1997), the Nike Labor Update Survey conducted
prior to the Tuck study indicated that the factory
mean wages were 553,668 (VS) and 653,080 (VJ),
and the factory base wages were 526,640 (VS) and
547,520 (VJ). Therefore, we expect that the addition
of a Nike worker into the house would increase
household income by more than the 350,594.5
dong indicated in our regression.
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Each addition of one non-Nike worker into the
household will increase household savings by
631,71.43 dong or $5.42. There was no significant
relationship between Nike workers in a household
and savings. This suggests that households without
Nike workers have discretionary income that can be
contributed toward household savings, but that
households with Nike workers are not able to have
savings. This finding supports O’Rourke’s (1998)
observation that no VS workers reported any
savings and that overall only 18 Nike workers
reported any savings. Although the Tuck report
noted that the Nike workers rarely have any
savings, they concluded that the factory workers
have enough income to generate significant discretionary income.
Each addition of one Nike worker into the
household will increase the household discretionary income by 262,237.6 dong or $22.51 per
month. Each addition of one non-Nike worker into
the household will increase the household discretionary income by 302,479.8 dong or $25.96 per
month. These findings indicate that non-Nike
workers in the household contribute to discretionary income more than would a Nike worker in the
household.
The results of these analyses contradict many of
Calzini et al.’s (1997) findings. These results use
data provided by Calzini et al. (1997) in their
appendices. The results suggest that having nonNike workers in the household increases household
income, discretionary income, and household
spending. Having non-Nike workers in the household is the only significant predictor of household
savings.
Further problems exist in the Tuck calculations.
In the Tuck report, housing rental expenses for VS
are actually calculated based upon two respondents
rather than from all those surveyed in the VS
community. Likewise, the housing rental expenses
for the VJ area are actually calculated based
upon eight respondents rather than from of all
those surveyed in the VJ community. Similar
procedures were used in reporting savings figures.
The Tuck figures were actually based on a small
subset of those surveyed (only those who reported
having savings) rather than being based upon all of
those surveyed (most of whom had no savings to
report).
Another error occurs in Tuck’s calculation of the
utility expenditures for the VJ community. Tuck
reports a mean of 58,869 and median of 45,000, yet
the correct figures should be 51,015 and 40,000,
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respectively. A similar calculation error occurs in
reporting the mean social insurance expenses per
household of the VS community.
The Tuck data, adjustments, errors, and omissions, in our view, grossly distort the data reliability,
and invalidate the point of their study: a comparison of Nike workers’ wages and expenses to that of
local community profiles.
Through the use of second-order ethnostatistics,
we reviewed and critiqued the assumptions and
methodology used in the Tuck study. To further
illustrate the significance of second-order ethnostatistical analysis, we used the data from the Tuck
study and incorporated our own assumptions and
methodology to reflect how the same data can yield
vastly different interpretations.

Third-order ethnostatistics
Third-order ethnostatistical studies focus on the
rhetoric and use of language as a tool of persuasion.
Third-order studies are concerned with how studies
are targeted toward a particular audience and how
they use language to create a validity and reality
that convinces and persuades the audience.
Meaning is indexical, or given by our choice of
words used in interpretation and description and
by the context in which these words are embedded;
meaning is not in the numbers, they can be
interpreted differently. Thus, differences in conclusions can be traced to differences in interpretations
and not to the numbers themselves (i.e., our
regression uses their numbers but the interpretations are different).
How did Nike and Tuck use rhetoric to validate
their study? Nike suppressed the fact that this was
an MBA student project. Rather, they emphasized
that this was a study done by Tuck in order to
establish credibility. They also suppressed the
conflict of interest inherent in the fact that they
paid for this research.
According to then-President and COO of Nike,
Thomas Clarke, ‘‘This study marks the first instance
where a research team from a prestigious business
school has been able to examine wages and
expenditure patterns using two highly reliable
sources – the actual household spending of the
workers themselves and the World Bank’’ (Nike,
1997).
The Tuck researchers further legitimate the study
by stating in the press release that ‘‘the faculty/MBA
student team from Dartmouth’s Tuck School have
also conducted business analyses and research for
other global companies including Disney, Citibank,
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Motorola and Hewlett Packard’’ (Nike, 1997). This
statement reflects an attempt to gain credibility by
suggesting that they are in good company.
The researchers, however, overlook inconsistencies in their own report. For example, they noted
that the VJ government-mandated minimum wage
is $35 per month and the VS government-mandated minimum wage is $45 per month. However,
they report that ‘‘the VJ area has noticeably higher
income levels than the VS area’’ (Calzini et al.,
1997: 12) and ‘‘higher levels of expenditures’’
(Calzini et al., 1997: 13).
The Tuck report concluded that Nike employees
have substantial discretionary income and are able
to acquire adequate standards of living. They also
cite James Rockwell, President of American Service
Company of Hanoi, in stating that ‘‘the average
annual income in Vietnam today is approximately
$220 while the average annual income of a Nike
worker is $384’’ (Calzini et al., 1997: 10). The Tuck
study confirms Mr. Rockwell’s statement by adding,
‘‘our research indicates that the annual income for
NIKE workers in the VS and VJ factories, calculated
using factory base wages, amounted to $545 and
$566, respectivelyy and suggest that the factories’
base wages are meeting or exceeding government
mandated minimum wage levels’’ (Calzini et al.,
1997: 10).
Additional rhetoric of Nike executives point to
anecdotal evidence as support for the Tuck findings. A Nike production director in Vietnam, Jarmo
Vahtervuo, stated that ‘‘when the factory opened
two years ago, workers rode on bicycles or walked.
Today, many Tae Kwang workers have moved up to
motorscooters, thanks to the wages they receive
from the factory’’ (Manning, 1997).
Within our statistical reanalysis of the data, we,
too, have incorporated rhetoric to lend credibility
to our own analysis of the data. Through the use of
third-order ethnostatistics, we are cautioned to be
aware of rhetoric and language that is used for the
purpose of persuasion. Rhetoric and language can
help legitimize even the most controversial material, as we have demonstrated.
We have examined a historical document from
three levels of ethnostatistics. First-level analyses
attempt to review and understand the context
within which statistics were created. Second-level
analyses attempt to review and understand the
statistics themselves. Third-level analyses attempt
to review the rhetoric and language used to make
the statistics persuasive. We conclude that ethnostatistics is a reasonable procedure for framing a

study to help understand quantitative work and the
resultant varying interpretations that are possible.
However, further analyses need to be done on the
data set. Future research could break out household
occupations into the same five categories provided
by Tuck. The data should then be coded to determine differences in occupation category related to
the dependent variable. There is currently too
much missing data to analyze income in terms of
specific occupations, such as a Nike factory worker.

Conclusion
We cannot be the arbitrator of truth and fantasy.
From an ethnostatistics viewpoint, different
researchers will assemble the numbers, interpretations, and generalizations differently. We recognize
that even our analysis is but one interpretation of
the data. What we have attempted to show with
an ethnostatistics analysis is that the bifurcation
of qualitative and quantitative data is false.
Researchers need to understand both statistics
and rhetoric for a thorough analysis of the data of
any study.
We selected a historical document that was quite
controversial at the time of its release. Amidst
controversy surrounding the labor practices of
subcontracted factories, Nike contracted with Tuck
Business School to conduct a study ‘‘to determine
how well suited [Nike] wages are to the local
economies and whether they are sufficient to allow
the workers to sustain a reasonable standard of
living for themselves and their families’’ (Calzini
et al., 1997: 4). The resultant study was favorable
toward Nike and concluded that Nike employees
have substantial discretionary income and are able
to acquire adequate standards of living. This study
created additional controversy because of its methodology and because the results countered activists’
claims, worker claims, and media reports.
We reviewed this study applying an ethnostatistical analysis. We used first-order ethnostatistics to
examine the context in which the study was
created and concluded that during this time of
turmoil, Nike needed supporting evidence that
their wages were reasonable and they contracted
with highly respected figures with a history of
favorable corporate reports. We used second-order
ethnostatistics to examine the assumptions and
appropriateness of the techniques used in constructing the data and used our own assumptions
and methodology to show how the same statistics
can yield different results. We used third-order
ethnostatistics to examine the study’s use of
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rhetoric and language as a tool of persuasion and
concluded that the report and press releases
surrounding the report were replete with tools of
rhetorical persuasion, as was our own reanalysis
and reinterpretation of the data.
This study demonstrating the use of ethnostatistics is an important methodological note because
academic researchers are being called upon to
answer important wage and labor conditions of
transnational corporations. A growing number of
academics are studying corporations such as CocaCola, Disney, Monsanto, McDonalds, and Nike
from various points of view. There is an ethical
responsibility for researchers to fully examine issues
under study and to ensure reliability and validity.
The ethnostatistics approach gives a framework for
assessing particular issues of reliability and validity
in ways that bridges both qualitative and quantitative interpretation. The criticisms of the Tuck study
and the current analysis are evidence of the way in
which context, assumptions and methodology, and
rhetoric and language influence the outcomes of
quantitative studies.

Post-script: an update on Nike events since
the Tuck report
As stated at the outset, the focus of our paper is on
methodology and not on Nike company practices.
Therefore, we felt it was important to write a postscript to provide an update on events since the
timeframe of our paper. Tuck has never issued any
statement or response to the criticisms of their
students’ report. Nike has made some encouraging,
albeit slow, changes since the Tuck report was
issued in 1997.
Tired of the negative publicity and image being
generated, in late 1997, Nike decided to set the
industry standard for reform (Emerson, 2001). This
decision was followed by the CEO Phil Knight’s
1998 landmark speech to the National Press Club
in which he vowed coming changes, which were
still criticized as a public relations move rather
than an effort at substantial change at the time
(Boje, 1998; Landrum, 2000). The 1998 Kaskey vs
Nike case over truth in advertising also proved to
be a significant moment in Nike’s development.
As later disclosed in their 2005–2006 corporate
responsibility report, it caused them to be critically
introspective and to re-examine their business
model (Nike, 2006a). As a result of the Kaskey vs
Nike lawsuit, Nike no longer makes claims in its
ads that it has resolved the sweatshop issue.
In addition, there are no longer references to
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‘‘transparency’’ of labor practices being made on
Nike’s websites. Nike decided to spend money on
pursuing social accountability instead of fighting
court cases, and Kaskey donated the settlement
money to the same goal.
One of the first improvements was noticed by
critics Dara O’Rourke and Garrett Brown even
before the Kaskey settlement when, in 1999, they
were invited to tour a Nike factory outside Ho Chi
Min city, and they noted improved air quality,
improved ventilation, reduced use of hazardous
chemicals, and manager training on safety issues
(Greenhouse, 1999). However, the Fair Labor
Association (FLA) (2001) report and a study of
O’Rourke and Brown (1999) noted that significant
health and safety compliance issues still remained.
The activist organization, Global Exchange, also
noted that Nike had increased Indonesian wages
and improved health conditions, but they pointed
out that Nike ‘‘still has a long way to go’’ (Global
Exchange, 1999). Since 1999, Nike claims to have
greatly improved labor practices in its contract
factories.
However, there are some indications that there
are still lingering labor practice issues (Boje and
Schipper, in press). In 2001, as Kuk Dong factory
workers in Mexico went on strike and Jonah Peretti
tried to personalize Nike shoes with the word
‘‘sweatshop,’’ Tim Connor’s (2001) research on
Nike progress toward Phil Knight’s 1998 promises
complained about slow progress in a web piece
published by Global Exchange entitled, ‘‘Still Waiting for Nike to Do It.’’ Yet, Nike issued its first
corporate responsibility report in 2001, which
documented continued labor problems and abuses
alongside claims of improvement in factories making their products.
Due to ongoing litigation in the Kaskey vs Nike
case, corporate responsibility reports were not
issued for the next 2 years, but Nike did begin
allowing random factory inspections by the FLA in
2002. They also cut back production in Thailand as
political turmoil allowed unions to form and wages
to increase, following a pattern of fleeing countries
where expectations were higher for wages and
working conditions (Schipper and Boje, 2008;
Landrum, 2000; Dhume and Tkacik, 2002).
In 2004, after the Kaskey vs Nike case was settled
out of court, Nike released their second corporate
responsibility report (Nike, 2004). This report
revealed further problems in factories but
announced the company’s plan to become a global
leader in corporate responsibility. During 2004,

Using an ethnostatistical analysis to interpret data

Nancy E Landrum and David M Boje

129

Nike expanded FLA factory monitoring beyond
labor conditions and began including environmental and safety inspections (Bernstein, 2004) while
gaining additional notice for its turnaround efforts
(Zadek, 2004).
In its 2005–2006 corporate responsibility report,
Nike disclosed its full list of supplier factories. It was
the first major footwear and apparel company to do
so. This disclosure won the praise of many for its
transparency and movement toward more responsible practices (Murray, 2005; Teather, 2005). Despite
the disclosure of difficulties in labor, environment
and health and safety standards, Nike reiterated its
intention to become a leading corporate citizen and
suggested that it was seeking large-scale systemic
change within the footwear and apparel industry by
addressing the root causes of problems, not just a
solution to the symptoms. The report was still
viewed as ‘‘more rhetoric than action’’ by Global
Exchange critic Neil Greenburg as reported in a Fox
News web report by AP writer Sarah Skidmore (2007).
Nike’s actions continued to be viewed as public
relations maneuvers by critic Jeffrey Ballinger and
others (Vasil, 2006). In an ironic twist, Nike endured
criticism after dropping a soccer ball supplier for
repeated labor violations (Montero, 2006).
In 2005, Nike was able to meet the Calvert fund’s
requirements for being a good corporate citizen for
the first time (Smitherman, 2005). During the same
year, the company was ranked 31st on Business
Ethics magazine’s 100 Best Corporate Citizens for
the first time (Business Ethics, 2005).
In 2006, a Canadian magazine that focuses on
corporate social responsibility, Corporate Knights
(2006), named Nike to its list of 100 most sustainable corporations in the world. Business Ethics
magazine (2006) listed the company as 13th of
the 100 Best Corporate Citizens, and SustainAbility
recognized the company for transparency and
sustainability reporting (Nike, 2006b). However, as
Boje and Schipper (in press) point out, transparency
does not imply integrity or openness.

In 2007, 10 of the 35 Nike plants in Vietnam
endured strikes as labor problems persisted (Rovell,
2008). Although their Vietnamese practices have
been dubbed ‘‘the industry gold standard,’’ workers
who had been on strike revealed that they were
abused and make barely enough to live (Rovell,
2008). Nike responds that they pay a ‘‘competitive
wage’’ rather than a living wage (Rovell, 2008). The
Vietnamese factory workers’ claims and the Nike
response are reminiscent of the difficulties of the
1990s. At the same time, Nike moved up to third
place on Business Ethics’ list of 100 Best Corporate
Citizens (2007).
To what degree has our and others’ critique of
Nike had a favorable impact upon changing labor
practices? Progress has been slow for Nike. While
the critics are not convinced that a turnaround has
occurred, there is increasing evidence that the
company is slowly moving toward improved conditions. In its public relations campaign, it is
strategically using all the appropriate corporate
responsibility-focused news networks to promote
its presence and make the case that there has been
incremental progress. Nike is no longer on the
defensive; rather it has emerged victorious and is
successfully using labor issues and the media to its
advantage. Yet absent the outside pressures of the
1990s, Nike is not moving as quickly as its critics
would like to win the race to reform. We believe
that the ethnostatistical methodology approach we
have taken is a way to assess empirical and
rhetorical claims being made in the monitoring of
labor practices. It is an emerging research approach
that can help sort out hyperbole from substantive
analysis.
Note
VS, 78 households were sampled; VJ, 68 were
sampled; total of 146 households (p. 7). A total of 149
VS and 151 VJ adults were interviewed to benchmark
households in the vicinity of each factory to represent
workers in 5373 in VS and 6376 in VJ.
1
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